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Navy Lieutenant Richard Dirk Selland found himself "in a situation
resembling that of a sparrow caught in a badminton game."' As a closeted
gay man in 1992, Selland was disturbed by shipmate kidding that he was
probably a "homosexual." The taunts escalated when the Democrats'
presidential nominee, Bill Clinton, promised to end the military's exclu-
sion of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals. Selland's internal turmoil im-
pelled him to seek counseling from the ship's chaplain. On the day after
Clinton's inauguration as President, the chaplain and Selland met with the
ship's commanding officer, and Selland admitted that he was "homosex-
ual" in orientation. Under the military policy then in effect, Selland was
unfit to serve: the policy held that homosexuality was incompatible with
military service, and flatly forbade homosexuals from serving in the mili-
tary. Selland's commander immediately removed him from his position.2
Soon thereafter, however, President Clinton announced his intention
to end the policy justifying such separations. The President's announcement
triggered a political firestorm. What emerged from the firestorm was a
policy of "don't ask, don't tell "' 3 Under this policy, military recruits and
personnel will not be asked about their sexual orientation. In theory, gay
men, lesbians, and bisexuals may serve in the military so long as they do
not engage in homosexual conduct.4 The change came on the heels of
several judicial decisions questioning the constitutionality of the previous
* Both professors are at Georgetown University Law Center. The authors would like
to thank Jay Schiffman, New York University Law School '93, for his excellent research
assistance and insightful critical comments. The authors also express their thanks to the
Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review editorial board and Harvard Law School
Lambda for co-hosting the Stonewall at 25. . .And Beyond Symposium, where many
helpful comments were received.
I Memorandum for Appellant at 3, Selland v. Aspin, Civ. No. 93-1924-LFO (D.D.C.
Sept. 28, 1993) (granting preliminary injunction).
21d.
3 The policy was initially implemented by executive order and subsequently codified
in a more restrictive form by statute. See Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Les
Aspin to Secretaries of the Army, Navy, Air Force and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (July 19, 1993) [hereinafter Aspin Memo]; Policy Guidelines on Homosexuality
in the Armed Forces, attachment to Aspin Memo (on file with authors) [hereinafter Policy
Guidelines]; National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, 10 U.S.C. § 654
(1993) (original version Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 571, 107 Stat. 1547, 1670-73 (1993)).
Regulations are presently being drafted to implement the policy.
4 See Policy Guidelines, supra note 3.
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policy which was predicated on sexual orientation.5 The military claims
that under its new policy, fitness to serve in the military now turns not on
one's sexual orientation, but on one's conduct. The qualifications for
admission state, "[s]exual orientation is considered a personal and private
matter, and homosexual orientation is not a bar to service entry or con-
tinued service unless manifested by homosexual conduct."
'6
This shift to conduct is misleading, however, for the military defines
conduct in expansive, Orwellian terms. Under the new policy, homosexual
conduct includes "any bodily contact, actively undertaken or passively
permitted, between members of the same sex for the purpose of satisfying
sexual desires"; "any bodily contact that a reasonable person would un-
derstand to demonstrate a propensity or intent to engage in [a homosexual
act]" (including same-sex hand-holding and kissing); a same-sex marriage
or attempted marriage; and any statement by the servicemember that he
or she is homosexual.
7
Unhappily for Selland, the new policy still excludes him from serv-
ice; the armed forces didn't ask, but he told. Although he admitted no
homosexual activity, his admission that he is gay creates a presumption
under the new policy that he has a propensity to engage in homosexual
acts. The only way he can defeat that inference is by proving that he has
no desire or propensity to engage in homosexual acts.
Like others before him, Selland has challenged his separation in
court.8 One of his arguments is that the military's action, predicated on
his statement "I am a homosexual," vi6lates the First Amendment. The
government's response is that it is not punishing Selland for the words "I
am a homosexual," but is using those words as evidence of conduct 9-
sodomy-that is illegal under the Code of Military Justice and that can
be criminalized under the constitutional authority of Bowers v. Hard-
wick.'0 Relying on similar reasoning, the government has thus far pre-
vailed against First Amendment arguments by bisexual, lesbian, and gay
soldiers protesting their discharges for making statements about their
sexual identities." During congressional hearings on the new policy, Pro-
5See Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1991), cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 655
(1992) (remanding for factual hearing to determine rational basis of old policy); Meinhold
v. United States Dep't of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1993) (invalidating old
policy as unconstitutional), appeal pending; see also Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir.
1993) vacated for reh'g en banc (subsequent decision striking down old policy).
6 See Aspin Memo, supra note 3, at 1.
7 See supra note 3.
8 Selland v. Aspin, Civ. No. 93-1924-LFO (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 1993) (granting prelimi-
nary injunction).
9 See supra note 3.
10478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia sodomy statute against constitutional
attack on privacy grounds).
I For cases where such First Amendment arguments have been addressed and rejected,
see Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1163-64 (9th Cir. 1991); Schowengerdt v. United
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fessor Cass Sunstein endorsed the government's position and opined that
there was at most a 1.5% chance that a court would accept any constitu-
tional challenge to the "don't ask, don't tell" policy. "So if the worry is
are the justices going to strike this one down, I think the answer is don't
worry" 
1 2
It remains to be seen whether Sunstein's dismissive prognosis will
be borne out, but he makes the government's core argument in a nutshell:
"This point," referring to the words-as-evidence-of-conduct argument,
"suggests that the [controlling] question is whether homosexual conduct,
as defined, is regulable behavior or status." 13 Sunstein insists that the
government's right to criminalize homosexual conduct allows it to use
admissions of homosexual identity as evidence of such homosexual con-
duct. We think Sunstein's position is descriptively oversimple under ex-
isting First Amendment jurisprudence, and normatively wrong under tra-
ditional First Amendment values.
This Article maintains that the government's restrictions on gays in
the military directly implicate First Amendment values, and should be
subject to strict scrutiny under current First Amendment case law. We do
not ignore Sunstein's insistence that expression and conduct are connected
in this instance, but we invert Sunstein's line of reasoning. Where he
argues that speech can be used as evidence of proscribable conduct, we
contend that the underlying prohibition on homosexual conduct is in fact
a restriction of expression. Homosexual conduct is expressive. While an
act's expressiveness does not in itself entitle the conduct to stringent First
Amendment protection, such protection is required where the govern-
ment's reason for regulating the conduct is predicated on its communica-
tive character, or where the government has selectively targeted some
States, 944 F.2d 483, 489 (9th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1514 (1992); Woodward
v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990);
High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 578-80 (9th Cir.
1990); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 462 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S.
1004 (1990).
12Assessment of the Plan to Lift the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Military Forces and Personnel of the House Comm. on Armed
Services, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 322 (1993) (statement of Cass R. Sunstein) [hereinafter
July 1993 House Hearings]; see id. at 324 ("I think one ought not to worry about judicial
challenges?'). These quotes are from Sunstein's oral colloquy with the Members of the
Subcommittee. His written statement (page 4) says: "There is no impermissible content
discrimination when the government uses words as evidence of regulable behavior or
status.' Id. at 260. Sunstein's written statement makes the further neo-republican point
that Congress may (and Sunstein argues should) interpret the Constitution more liberally
than the Court has. See Stephen F. Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection, 72
MINN. L. REv. 311 (1987). The public record does not reveal that the Representatives had
much interest in what they "might" do; their interest was focused on what limits the Court
"would" impose on them.
13July 1993 House Hearings, supra note 12, at 260 (prepared statement of Cass R.
Sunstein).
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forms of conduct and not others based on their message. The only reasons
the government offers for the military's regulation of homosexual conduct
are based on what that conduct communicates to other service members
who may be offended by knowledge that some of their fellow soldiers are
gay or lesbian. Moreover, the military policy treats the very same con-
duct-hand-holding, kissing, marriage, and sexual contact-differently
depending on whether it sends a heterosexual or homosexual message.
Therefore, under established First Amendment doctrine, the military's
policy is "related to the suppression of expression" and must be justified
under the traditional strict scrutiny accorded to regulation of speech.'
4
We do not limit our argument to the military's newly expanded
definition of conduct. The military's criminal prohibition of sodomy itself,
and indeed all state sodomy statutes, also regulate expressive conduct
based on what that conduct communicates to others, and, therefore, should
also be subject to traditional strict First Amendment scrutiny. In Bowers
v. Hardwick, the Supreme Court upheld a statute criminalizing sodomy
against a due process challenge, finding that it was rationally related to
the state's interest in upholding morality.15 No First Amendment argument
was raised, and the Court subjected the statute to only relaxed rational
basis scrutiny. But the rationale for regulating sodomy-upholding com-
munity morals-is inextricably related to what sodomy expresses to the
community, and therefore sodomy statutes should have to satisfy strict
scrutiny, not rational basis review. They cannot meet that more stringent
standard. Thus, the argument advanced here offers a doctrinal method for
rethinking, and ultimately overruling, Bowers.
Prominent constitutional scholars, including former Solicitor General
Charles Fried, have argued that Bowers was wrongly decided and will be
overruled sooner or later.16 As the preeminent symbol of the legal sup-
14 Sunstein and the government also argue that such regulation in the context of
military service would pass strict scrutiny, id. at 262-64, and we dispute that conclusion
as well.
15 See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194-96 (1986).
16 See CHARLES FRIED, ORDER AND LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION-A
FIRSTHAND ACCOUNT 71-88 (1991); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
LAw 1424-33 (2d ed.) (1988); Janet E. Halley, Reasoning About Sodomy: Act and Identity
In and After Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 VA. L. REv. 1721, 1748-53 (1993).
Fried would, however, support a ban on homosexual conduct by members of the armed
services. See FRIED, supra, at 219 n.26. But see Ronald Dworkin, The Reagan Revolution
and the Supreme Court, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, July 18, 1991, at 23. Fried's letter to the editor
and Dworkin's response appear in N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Aug. 15, 1991, at 65. See also Charles
M. Freeland, Note, The Political Process as Final Solution, 68 IND. L.J. 525 (1993);
Joshua Schwartz, The President's Lawyer as Frie(n)d, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1081
(1992).
After retiring, Justice Powell himself questioned his deciding vote in Bowers. In
response to a student at a New York University Law School presentation, he stated with
respect to his Bowers vote, "I probably made a mistake in that one." Anand Agneshwar,
Ex-Justice Says He May Have Been Wrong, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 5, 1990, at 3. According to
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pression of gays and lesbians, Bowers is to the growing gay rights move-
ment what Plessy v. Ferguson17 was to the civil rights movement, and what
Dred Scott v. Sandford8 was to the abolitionists. Each of these decisions
reflects the Court's failure to recognize the equal humanity and person-
hood of members of a minority group. Because Bowers focused on sexual
conduct rather than identity, it appears to invite rationales like those the
military now advances, which separate sexual identity from sexual con-
duct. The First Amendment tradition we invoke bridges the gap that
Bowers created, by noting the integral connection between regulation of
expressive sexual conduct and regulation of sexual identity.
The argument we advance in this Article is different in kind from the
First Amendment arguments pressed to date in challenges to the military's
ban on gay and lesbian members. Previous arguments have focused on
the punishment imposed on service members for admitting that they are
gay.19 We argue that even the underlying regulation of homosexual con-
duct should be subjected to First Amendment strict scrutiny because the
rationales for that regulation turn wholly on the offense that the conduct
communicates to others. Because homosexual conduct between consent-
ing adults can have no effect on society other than by virtue of what it
communicates, 20 its regulation should trigger searching examination by a
reviewing court.
The first Parts of this Article track First Amendment theory and
doctrine. In adjudicating the constitutionality of statutes regulating ex-
pressive conduct, the Supreme Court has applied a two-step analysis. It
asks first whether the conduct is expressive, namely, whether it is intended
to communicate and whether it is likely to be understood by an audience
as communicative.2 1 This is a low threshold, recognizing that a great deal
the Washington Post, in conference, Justice Powell agreed to provide the fifth vote to
invalidate the statute but instead filed a brief concurring opinion suggesting that, while
criminalizing sodomy does not violate substantive due process, serious punishment would
raise an Eighth Amendment issue. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196 (Powell, J., concurring);
Al Kamen, Powell Changed Vote in Sodomy Case, WASH. POST, July 13, 1986, at 1.
17 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
1860 U.S. 393 (1856).
19 See cases cited supra note 11. For related arguments along different lines see Jos6
G6mez, The Public Expression of Lesbian/Gay Personhood as Protected Speech, 1 LAw
& INEQ. J. 121 (1983); Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexu-
ality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1285, 1295-96 (1985).20 It might be argued that homosexual conduct might undermine a social policy in
favor of procreation. But there is no evidence that procreation per se is a goal of our
society; indeed, overpopulation is a more likely social concern. And even if procreation
were a goal, penalizing homosexual conduct would not necessarily contribute to the goal.
More open toleration of gay and lesbian couples could encourage the formation of families
that might not otherwise form, through artificial insemination (for lesbian couples) and
surrogacy (for gay couples).
21 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405
(1974).
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of conduct can be communicative, from burning a flag to wearing an
arm-band to shooting a President. We argue in Part I that homosexual
conduct not only easily satisfies this threshold inquiry, but its treatment
as expression is consistent with the essential purposes served by the First
Amendment.
The second step in the analysis of regulation of expressive conduct
is the critical one: it asks whether the government's purpose in regulating
the conduct is related to the conduct's expressive elements. 22 A law bar-
ring murder, for example, is designed to protect human life, irrespective
of what the murderer communicates, and therefore does not violate the
First Amendment even if applied to an assassination designed to send a
political message. Part II posits that the military's regulation of "homo-
sexual conduct," by contrast, is concerned solely with what that conduct
communicates. Moreover, the policy punishes some conduct and not other
conduct based on the message it expresses, just as the city ordinance in
R.A.V v. City of St. Paul23 punished some instances of symbolic hate
speech and not others. While the sodomy prohibition is less explicitly
predicated on what sodomy communicates, it too cannot be justified ex-
cept by virtue of the harm assertedly caused by communication of the
conduct to others.
Part I demonstrates that the military's justifications for its policy do
not withstand strict scrutiny, and Part IV argues that the deference tradi-
tionally shown by the Court to the President in matters of military policy
does not save the gay/lesbian exclusion. Finally, Part V addresses the
broader implications of our argument. Does extending First Amendment
protection to private sodomy require its extension to public sodomy? If
not, have we inverted traditional First Amendment values, by protecting
private but not public communication? If the state may regulate obscenity
in order to preserve social order and morality, why shouldn't it be allowed
to regulate sodomy? And most importantly, does this argument invalidate
all morals regulation? Our position resurrects arguments previously ad-
vanced by H.L.A. Hart and John Stuart Mill against morals regulations,
but suggests that First Amendment concerns about censorship provide a
normative baseline for identifying some impermissible forms of morals
regulation. 24
22See United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990); Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404. See
also R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
23 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
24See J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 93 (E. Rapaport ed. 1978) (only preventing harm to
others justifies interfering with individual's liberty); H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND
MORALITY (1963) (responding to PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS
(1965)). See also Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality and Political Values: Search-
ing for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073, 1091-98
(1988).
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I. Sexual Expression and First Amendment Values
If conduct is not expressive, the First Amendment is not implicated.
If one engages in conduct without any intent to communicate, or if
nobody would understand one's action as communicating anything, there
is nothing for the First Amendment to protect. Thus, the threshold inquiry
in any expressive conduct case is whether the plaintiff's conduct was
intended to communicate a message, or whether it would be understood
by others as communicative.
25
Both the broadly defined "conduct" regulated by the military's new
policy and the conduct traditionally criminalized by sodomy laws meet
the basic First Amendment threshold. As noted above, the new military
policy defines "homosexual conduct" to include a statement by a service-
member that she is homosexual, a same-sex marriage, and "any bodily
contact which a reasonable person would understand to demonstrate a
propensity or intent to engage in" homosexual contact for sexual pleas-
ure.26 Thus, not only is sodomy sufficient to justify separation from the
armed forces, but so apparently is "hand-holding or kissing in most cir-
cumstances," same-sex marriage, or an admission that one is gay or
lesbian.
27
An admission of sexual identity is expressive in the strictest sense of
the word. But all of the other "conduct" that military policy regulates is
equally expressive. Regulation of this conduct implicates the core values
served by the First Amendment's guarantee of free expression in ways at
least as profound as other regulations that the Supreme Court has invali-
25 Compare Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989) (fiagburning is communica-
tive) and Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456 (1991) (erotic dancing is
communicative) with Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24-25 (1989) (purely recreational
dancing is not communicative, so long as its goal is nothing more than calisthenic).
The Supreme Court's decision in the old "fighting words" case would add a further
(and we think questionable) threshold: some expressive conduct is "of such slight social
value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality." Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942). Chaplinsky may have inspired the plurality opinion in Young v. American Mini
Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (opinion of Stevens, J., for four Justices), but any implication
that there are "tiers" of expression was rejected by a Court majority in that case, id. at t
n.l (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 85 (four dissenting Justices). See also
Fed. Communications Comm'n. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (Powell, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). We, too, reject this broad reading of
Chaplinsky and only discuss that possible implication here because it can be demonstrated
that sexual expression between two people, or even alone in one's house, is conduct that
goes to the core of what the First Amendment has come to mean in our society.26 See 10 U.S.C. § 654(f)(3); Aspin Memo, supra note 3, at 2 ("homosexual conduct");
Policy Guidelines, supra note 3, at 1 ("homosexual activities").
27 See Policy Guidelines, supra note 3, at 1. Other activities, "such as association with
known homosexuals, presence at a gay bar, possessing or reading homosexual publications,
or marching in a gay rights rally in civilian clothes" would not, under the executive policy,
constitute a basis for discharge. See id. at 1-2.
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dated. The First Amendment furthers the mutually reinforcing ideals of
individual liberty and pluralistic tolerance. The military's regulation of
sexual expression implicates both of these complementary values.
The First Amendment tradition is committed to individual liberty; it
assures a safe haven for individuals to develop and then to express their
ideas, feelings, and emotions in a manner that suits them.28 This libertar-
ian value of the First Amendment has two features, one communicative
and one developmental.
As the Supreme Court has recognized, sexual expression possesses
deep communicative significance. Eight Justices agreed that nude dancing
in public is "expressive conduct" in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.29 The
ninth Justice, Scalia, defined "inherently expressive conduct" as activity
"that is normally engaged in for the purpose of communicating an idea,
or perhaps an emotion, to someone else. '30 Sexual conduct-from hand-
holding to kissing to intercourse-is expressive in precisely this way.
While also engaged in for carnal pleasure and (in increasingly rare in-
stances) procreative purposes, sex is intrinsically communicative and may
express a wide range of emotions-love, desire, power, dependency, even
rage or hatred.31 Indeed, the communicative power of sex is often un-
matched by other forms of communication. 32 To say "I love you" is one
thing; to hold a lover's hand in public to express one's love can express
something quite different; and "to make love" is often a still more pro-
found expression of what one feels and thinks. Even when no one else is
28This is the necessary implication to be drawn from cases such as Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (protecting right of person to print "Fuck the Draft" on his
jacket); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972) (protecting freedom of
individual movement); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (protecting right of person
to view pornography); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (protecting within a
"penumbra" of First Amendment, among others, a couple's right to use contraceptives).
See generally THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970); C.
Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964
(1978); Martin Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591 (1982).
29 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2460 (1991) (plurality opinion) (accepting that nude dancing is
"expressive conduct"); id. at 2468 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 2471-72
(White, J., dissenting). Only Justice Scalia refused to join this consensus. Id. at 2463-65
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).30Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2466 n.4.31 For useful, and differently focused, introductions to the communicative features of
sex, see 1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY (Robert Hurley trans., Ist ed.
1978); RICHARD D. MOHR, GAYS/JUSTICE: A STUDY OF ETHICS, SOCIETY, AND LAW
106-14 (1988); CAMILLE PAGLIA, SEXUAL PERSONAE 1-39 (1990); RICHARD A. POSNER,
SEX AND REASON 111-45 (1992).
32 Sexual expression is one example of what Justice Harlan spoke of in Cohen, 403
U.S. at 26, where he stressed the importance of the choice of specific words to the
message. Just as "words are often chosen as much for their emotive as for their cognitive
force:' so sexual conduct is often chosen for its emotive force in communicating certain
messages that cannot be equally communicated through mere words. And "that emotive
function ... may often be the more important element of the overall message sought to
be communicated." Id.
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watching, all of these acts are, to use Justice Scalia's terms, "normally
engaged in for the purpose of communicating ...an emotion ...to
someone else.
33
Sexual conduct is also important to the developmental feature of the
liberty value. The First Amendment protects the individual's freedom to
explore, develop, and expand upon her identity. It assures that the state may
not seek to control a person's thoughts or beliefs, those intellectual char-
acteristics that are central to our identities. Sexual expression is equally
important to individual development. Indeed, some philosophers consider
expression of the passionate, sexual side of ourselves to be more identity-
generative than expression of the verbal, intellectual side. They posit that
a goal of flourishing human beings is "self-expansion," which seeks "any-
thing experienced as rapidly expanding the self, such as bursts of creative
insights, religious conversions, discoveries ... and, notably, falling in
love and intense sexual experiences. 34 There is no doubt that in our
culture, sexual orientation is a critical feature of one's identity; indeed,
the very laws we challenge in this Article are themselves testament to that
fact. Talking about and engaging in sex is a useful if not necessary way for
a person to explore, discover, announce, and/or renounce her orientation.
35
This interest in people's exploration of their own sexuality and iden-
tity underlies, albeit indirectly, Stanley v. Georgia,36 where the Court
struck down a law prohibiting possession of obscene materials in the
home, even though the state may prohibit the manufacture and sale of the
same obscene materials. 37 "If the First Amendment means anything," the
Court said, "it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting
alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he may
watch" 38 In other words, Mr. Stanley's sexual fantasies were his busi-
ness-and not the state's.
Both the military's exclusion policy and sodomy statutes generally
threaten the developmental and communicative values of the First Amend-
ment. The military policy acknowledges that lesbians, gay men, and bi-
sexuals serve (and have served) honorably and productively in the armed
forces and expressly permits them to continue to serve-but only at
33Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2466 n.4 (Scalia, J., concurring).
34 Arthur Aron & Elaine Aron, Love and Sexuality, in SEXUALITY IN CLOSE RELATION-
SHiPS 42 (Kathleen McKinney & Susan Sprecher eds., 1991).
35 See Vivienne C. Cass, The Implications of Homosexual Identity Formation for the
Kinsey Model and Scale of Preference, in HOMOSEXUALITY/HETEROSEXXUALITY: CONCEPTS OF
SEXUAL ORIENTATION 39 (David P. McWhirter et al. eds., 1990).
36 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
37 United States v. Twelve 200-Ft. Reels, 413 U.S. 123 (1973) (importation of obscene
materials for private use may be prohibited); United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973)
(upholding statute barring distribution of obscenity in interstate commerce, even if only
for personal use).
38Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
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substantial cost to their personal liberty. If, like Dirk Selland, a gay man
must closet his feelings even when talking with the chaplain, the armed
forces are seeking to close down a critical part of the man's identity. It
is akin to asking a Jew to hide her ethnicity and religion, a woman to
cover up her gender, or an African American to disguise her race. Just as
Stanley objected that the state may not tell a person what books to read
in his own home, so the state may not force that person to confine his
identity to the closet.
Sodomy statutes also implicate developmental and communicative
values. In Bowers v. Hardwick,39 however, the Supreme Court expressly
refused to extend Stanley to prohibit the state from telling a man what
consensual sex he may have in the privacy of his own home. The Bowers
Court distinguished Stanley as a First Amendment case, rather than a right
to privacy case, implicitly insisting that Michael Hardwick's appeal did
not preserve any First Amendment ground.40 While Hardwick invoked
Stanley for his privacy argument, he did not specifically raise a First
Amendment challenge.4' Thus, Bowers does not foreclose analysis of
sodomy prohibitions under the First Amendment.
42
The First Amendment also has a strong social or political component.
Its protection of individual autonomy and liberty engenders collective
benefits in the body politic, by fostering a diverse citizenry and assuring
that "debate on public issues [is] uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," as
the Court said in New York Times v. Sullivan.43 Homosexual conduct, from
public hand-holding and kissing by same-sex couples to private sexual
conduct, fosters the diverse polity that the First Amendment envisions.
Public expression of same-sex intimacy is as important a critique of
gender assumptions and gender roles in American society as any publish-
ed treatise.44 It is therefore not only individually expressive, but also
socially valuable under the robust pluralism endorsed in Sullivan. The fact
that gestures like kissing and hand-holding are symbolic of ideas and
attitudes rather than literal statements of position in a debate does not




42 Cf Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217
(1993) (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment) (urging this sort of reason for overruling
Employment Div., Dep't. of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)).
43376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is
an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REV. 245. But see Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
44 See infra text accompanying note 49; Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social
Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187; see also Elvia R. Arriola, Sexual Identity and
the Constitution: Homosexual Persons as a Discrete and Insular Minority, 10 WOMEN'S
RTS. L. REP. 143 (1988); Nan Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, I
LAw & SEXUALITY 9 (1991).
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diminish their importance. The public debate has never been limited to
books, articles, letters to the editor, speeches, and signs; it has always
included symbolic gestures such as dancing, visual art, advertising im-
agery, public demonstrations, clothing, and physical conduct.
45
While private homosexual conduct does not directly contribute to
public debate in the way that public affirmations of homosexuality do, it
nonetheless plays an indispensable part in shaping public debate. Because
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals explore and develop their sexual identity
through private sexual conduct, that "private" conduct is critical to their
ability to take part as lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals in public life.
Sodomy laws and the military exclusion are two of many mechanisms by
which society has discouraged such personal exploration and develop-
ment. The repression is political as much as personal, for it reflects a
social effort to keep homosexuality "in the closet' not only hidden from
the public but incapable of contributing to public discourse and politics. 6
Since the Stonewall riots of June 1969, large numbers of lesbians and gay
men have defied the tyranny of the closet, and only that defiance has made
it possible for their voices to be heard in American politics. So long as
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals kept their orientation a secret, they could
"pass" in American society.47 Passing not only exacted incalculable per-
sonal costs from individuals, but also discouraged the formation of an
openly gay subculture and gay and lesbian political activism.48 Once
people started defying that suppression, they formed a thriving political
as well as cultural community. That community could not exist without
homosexual expression. For bisexuals, lesbians, and gay men, the per-
sonal is the political.
4 9
As Lee Bollinger has suggested, the First Amendment serves a peda-
gogical function in reflecting our social commitment to tolerance.50 Insist-
ing that society restrain its impulse to persecute unpopular minorities, the
45See, e.g., Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (waving flag); Brown v.
Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (sit-in); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (burning
flag); Tinker v. Des Moines Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing armband).
460n the complicated features of the closet, see EVE KosoFKY SEDGWICK, EPISTE-
MOLOGY OF THE CLOSET (1990).4 7 Contrary to lore, heterosexual Americans are usually incapable of "detecting" a gay
person who does not want to reveal her sexual identity. WARREN J. BLUMENFELD & DIANE
RAYMOND, LOOKING AT GAY AND LESBIAN LIFE 86 (1993).
48 We only say "discouraged" because there were, of course, gay subcultures well
before Stonewall, and a handful of activists fought social and political discrimination
before 1969. See JOHN D'EnLiO, SEXUAL POLITICS, SEXUAL COMMUNITIES: THE MAKING
OF A HOMOSEXUAL MINORITY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1940-1970 (1983).4 9 The personal as political is also ironically true for homophobes. Their personal
anxiety about same-sex intimacy manifests itself in public efforts to suppress the expres-
sion they fear.
50 See LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREM-
IST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986).
HeinOnline  -- 29 Harv C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 329 1994
330 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review
First Amendment sets a public example that might inspire cooperative
rather than exclusionary conduct throughout society. In the past, the First
Amendment has protected the Amish, Jehovah's Witnesses, the NAACP,
Communists, Nazis, and various ethnic groups-all despised by popular
majorities. 51 The First Amendment's willingness to insulate groups against
suppression has contributed to its strength over time. By their sexual
conduct, lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals are creating or searching for
their own identities and voices, and the First Amendment insists that this
new group be given the same public space as previous groups have been
afforded.
Both the military policy and sodomy laws strike at the values of
pluralism and tolerance implicit in the First Amendment. Kenneth Karst
has shown that military service in American history has been a badge of
citizenship, and that exclusions from military service reflect exclusions
from citizenship.5 2 In fact, he argues, the exclusion and later segregation
of people of color, the exclusion and later segregation of women, and the
exclusion of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals can be attributed to an ideology
of "manhood," where the members of one race, one gender, and one
sexual orientation are held up as the people who ought to run and defend
our country. So, too, sodomy statutes offend the values of toleration. To
prescribe by criminal law the forms of non-harmful sexual intimacy that
consenting adults may engage in is the very definition of intolerance.
All that we have sought to demonstrate in this Part is that sexual
conduct-whether it be hand-holding or intercourse-is expressive. In-
deed, sex without expression is virtually inconceivable. Establishing this
fact does not, of course, doom the regulations we question; all sorts of
regulations of expressive conduct are indisputably constitutional. But the
values noted above at least require that the regulation of sexual conduct
undergo the First Amendment expressive conduct analysis that follows.
II. The Military Exclusion Policy and Sodomy Laws Trigger Stringent
First Amendment Scrutiny
The government generally has a free hand to regulate expressive
conduct, with two significant and related exceptions. When the reason the
51See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (Amish protected by Free
Exercise Clause); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S.
415 (1963) (NAACP protected by First Amendment right of association); Yates v. United
States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), and Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961) (Commu-
nists protected by Speech Clause); Skokie v. Nat'l Socialist Party of America, 366 N.E.2d
347 (1977) (Nazis protected by First Amendment); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969) (KKK protected by First Amendment).
52 Kenneth L. Karst, The Pursuit of Manhood and the Desegregation of the Armed
Forces, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 499 (1991).
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government seeks to regulate particular conduct relates to what that con-
duct communicates to others, its regulation is treated as a prohibition on
speech. And when government treats similar conduct differently based on
its content, it also triggers strict First Amendment review. The military
policy requires strict First Amendment scrutiny for both reasons.
Because virtually all conduct is potentially expressive, the critical
First Amendment inquiry is why the government is regulating the particu-
lar conduct it has targeted. If those reasons are unrelated to the expressive
elements of the conduct, as in a prohibition on sex with minors,53 the
regulation is subject to relaxed scrutiny, and generally upheld.54 If, on the
other hand, the regulation is tied to what the conduct communicates to
others, the law must be treated as if it were a regulation of speech itself,
and subjected to strict scrutiny.55 As Justice (then Judge) Scalia put it,
freedom of expression makes the communicative nature of con-
duct an inadequate basis for singling out that conduct for pro-
scription. A law directed at the communicative nature of conduct
must, like a law directed at speech itself, be justified by the
substantial showing of need that the First Amendment requires.
5 6
For example, when first Texas and then the United States sought to
outlaw flagburning, the Court found that the governmental interest was in
suppressing the messages associated with flag-burning, and subjected the
laws to traditional First Amendment scrutiny.57 By contrast, when protest-
ers who sought to dramatize the plight of the homeless by sleeping in
Lafayette Park challenged the National Park Service's ban on sleeping in
53 The prohibition of sex with minors is founded upon scientific, philosophical, and
experiential evidence that such sex causes psychological damage to the minor.54 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77, 384 (1968).
55 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989).
56 Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Watt, 703 F.2d 586, 622 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(en banc) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original), rev'd sub nom., Clark v. Commu-
nity for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984). See also John Hart Ely, Flag
Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First
Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482, 1497-98 (1975).
This expressive conduct analysis is consistent with the Court's doctrine relating to
more traditional forms of speech. All communication can be seen as comprised of both
physical characteristics (time, place, and manner) and communicative elements (content).
Thus, just as a content based regulation of speech triggers stringent scrutiny, so too does
a regulation motivated by the communicative content of conduct. Similarly, regulation of
conduct "unrelated to the suppression of expression" is analogous to regulation of the time,
place, and manner of speech. Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 (1984) (noting that the same test
applies to time, place, and manner restrictions on speech and to regulation of conduct
"unrelated to the suppression of expression").57See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310
(1990).
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parks, the Court upheld the ban under minimal scrutiny.58 It found that
the governmental interest in prohibiting sleeping in parks had nothing to
do with the message a would-be sleeper might communicate, but instead
was predicated on safety and upkeep of the parks.
59
Thus, the critical question in reviewing any regulation of symbolic
expression is whether the government's interest in banning the conduct is
"related to the suppression of expression," as the Court put it in Texas v.
Johnson.60 Under this analysis, both the military policy prohibiting homo-
sexual conduct and the Code of Military Justice's criminalization of sod-
omy trigger stringent First Amendment examination.
The very name given to the military's policy---"don't ask, don't
tell"-reveals that it is designed to regulate expression. The military
expressly disclaims any concern with whether an individual is in fact
homosexual; its concern is specifically with those individuals who "tell"
that fact to others, by proclaiming that they are gay or lesbian in word or
deed. Thus, the bulk of the "conduct" regulated by the new policy consists
of public expressions of homosexuality, e.g., hand-holding, kissing, mar-
riage, or saying that one is homosexual.
The military has conceded that homosexual identity does not affect
a soldier's ability to perform in the military, except to the extent that the
identity is expressed to others. General Colin Powell, then Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified in Congress that gays and lesbians had
always served in the military, and that their presence did not cause any
problems as long as they remained "in the closet." Asked by Congressman
Barney Frank whether there is any evidence of behavior problems as a
result of the longstanding presence of gays and lesbians in the military,
Powell responded:
No, because as a matter of fact they have kept, so-called, in the
closet. It is quite a different thing when it is openly practiced or
openly known throughout the force and within the units. I think
it makes very difficult management problems. 61
Powell has consistently reiterated this view in subsequent congressional
appearances, and it is now the official Defense Department line.62
58 Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984).59 1d. at 297-98.
6 0Johnson, 491 U.S. at 407.
61 Fiscal Year 1993 Defense Budget: Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Budget,
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1992).62 See July 1993 House Hearings, supra note 12 (testimony of Gen. Powell and
Secretary Aspin); Gays in the Military: Hearings of the Senate Armed Services Comm.,
103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter July 1993 Senate Hearings].
[Vol. 29
HeinOnline  -- 29 Harv C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 332 1994
1994] First Amendment Protection of Homosexual Conduct 333
A "don't ask, don't tell" policy makes sense only if homosexual
conduct and identity are not in themselves problematic: if they were, there
would be no basis for directing military officers not to ask about or
investigate homosexuality. Enforcement is triggered only by public dec-
larations of homosexuality, whether through statements or symbolic ges-
tures. Thus, same-sex hand-holding or marriage, two public statements of
sexual identity, are grounds for discharge unless the individual can prove
that he or she has no propensity or intent to engage in homosexual sex.
By contrast, hand-holding in private, or a private commitment to a lifelong
homosexual relationship, does not trigger investigation or penalty.
When government selectively regulates public conduct, as the mili-
tary has done with respect to declarations of homosexual identity, it raises
heightened First Amendment concerns. 63 By singling out public conduct,
the regulations imply that the government's interest does not have to do
with the physical aspects of the conduct, but with what the conduct commu-
nicates to others. Similarly, the fact that the military's new policy singles
out admissions of homosexuality, but does not inquire into whether an
individual is homosexual absent such an admission, underscores the mili-
tary's concern for what is communicated, rather than for the underlying
reality of homosexual orientation. The military's "bargain"--gays and
lesbians may serve so long as they remain "in the closet" or so long as
they publicly repudiate any desire to consummate their sexual desires-
demonstrates that the military seeks to regulate not homosexuality itself,
but its public acknowledgment and expression, that is, its communicative
content.6
4
The military's stated rationales for its policy also reflect a concern
for what homosexual conduct communicates to others. The military has
advanced two principal arguments for its regulation, each of which un-
derscores its interest in regulating the expression of homosexuality rather
63 In Johnson, 491 U.S. at 403, the fact that Texas prohibited only flag-burnings that
would offend "one or more persons likely to observe or discover" the burning flag, led the
Court to conclude that the statute was directed toward flag-burning's communicative
elements. By contrast, in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 375 (1968), the Court
treated a draft card burning regulation as not related to the suppression of expression in
part because the law "does not distinguish between public and private destruction."
64 For this reason, the new policy is more vulnerable to a broad First Amendment
attack than the old policy. Under the old policy, the military maintained that it was not
penalizing service members for their speech, but for their identity or status. Homosexuality
itself was the disqualifying characteristic, and an admission of homosexuality was merely
used as evidence of one's status. See, e.g., Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 462 (7th
Cir. 1989) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to old policy because "it is the identity
that makes [appellant] ineligible for military service, not the speaking of it aloud"), cert.
denied 494 U.S. 1004 (1990). Under current policy, however, the military concedes that
homosexuality itself is not incompatible with military service; rather, the regulations focus
specifically on the communication of one's homosexuality to others. We believe that both
the old and new policies fail the expressive conduct analysis, but the new policy clarifies
the military's expression-suppressive purpose.
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than homosexuality itself. First, it argues that "morale" and "unit cohe-
sion" will be threatened by the presence of openly gay, lesbian, and
bisexual personnel. 65 But the "don't ask" half of its policy concedes that
"morale" and "unit cohesion" are not threatened by the presence of clos-
eted gay, lesbian, and bisexual personnel. Thus, the problem has less to
do with identity or conduct itself than with the expression of that identity
or conduct to others. The military's interests are threatened only by the
communication of gay members' sexual identities to other (presumably
homophobic) members of a military unit.
Second, the government has contended that the presence of gay and
lesbian soldiers in the military will invade the privacy of heterosexual
soldiers, given the close quarters that military life frequently requires. But
once again, the fact that the military allows closeted gay, lesbian, and
bisexual personnel to serve suggests that the privacy concern is triggered
not by the mere presence of such personnel, but by the public acknow-
ledgement of their presence.
While the current challenges to the military's exclusionary policy
have primarily focused on the regulation of public declarations of homo-
sexuality, the military's underlying prohibition on homosexual sodomy-
and indeed all regulation of sodomy-also requires stringent First Amend-
ment scrutiny under the analysis we have set out. Because sodomy is
potentially and possibly even inherently expressive, stringent First Amend-
ment scrutiny applies unless the government's interest in regulating sod-
omy is unrelated to the suppression of expression. The rationale consistently
advanced for the regulation of sodomy is the maintenance of community
morality. Sodomy is said to be immoral, and society condemns it for that
reason. Many might argue that this moral condemnation holds irrespective
of what the sodomy communicates, thus immunizing it from stringent
First Amendment review.
That argument, however, begs the question. One might equally claim
that burning a flag or cross is immoral. To say that conduct is immoral is
to say little more than that the majority disapproves of it. The further
question that First Amendment analysis asks is why does society condemn
65 See July 1993 Senate Hearings, supra note 62 (testimony of Gen. Powell and the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, supporting the new policy of "don't ask, don't tell").
In House hearings, several "unofficial" witnesses favoring the military exclusion made
arguments that "homosexuals" were actually unfit for military service, based upon their
alleged selfishness, Policy Implications of Lifting the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military:
Hearings Before the House Comm. on Armed Services, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 89 (1993)
[hereinafter May 1993 House Hearings] (testimony of Col. John Ripley), or predatory
nature. Id. at 94-102 (statement of Brig. Gen. William Weise). Those testimonies were not
embraced by the official policymakers (the Joint Chiefs, headed by Gen. Powell, and
Secretary Aspin, none of whom testified in these hearings) and were rebutted in detail by
reference to empirical studies. Id. at 247-61 (prepared statement of Dr. Gregory Herek,
for the American Psychological Association).
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sodomy as immoral? If it is immoral because it causes harm in a non-
communicative manner, as murder certainly does, the First Amendment's
stringent review would not be appropriate. But if the moral harm it causes
is related to what it communicates, its regulation should trigger strict
scrutiny.
How does consensual homosexual conduct harm the community, other
than by what it expresses to that community? A consensual act of homo-
sexual sodomy has no physical effect whatsoever on anyone other than
the participants. It can affect the broader community only if the fa6t that
it occurred is somehow communicated to the community, thereby offend-
ing or demoralizing its homophobic members. It may well be precisely
this reason that sodomy has long been referred to as the "unmentionable
crime," crimen innominatum,66 "a heinous act 'the very mention of which
is a disgrace to human nature,' and 'a crime not fit to be named."'
67
Because society's (or the military's) interests can be undermined only if
the fact of the proscribed sodomy is in some way communicated, the
government's interest in regulating sodomy is necessarily related to sod-
omy's expressive character.
We have demonstrated thus far that First Amendment strict scrutiny
is required for both the "don't ask, don't tell" policy and for state or
federal sodomy laws, on the ground that both laws regulate expressive
conduct because of what that conduct expresses to others. A related line
of First Amendment argumentation supports the same conclusion: the
First Amendment's strict scrutiny is also triggered where government
selectively regulates expressive conduct on content-based grounds. As the
Supreme Court said in R.A.V v. City of St. Paul, in striking down a
municipal prohibition against cross-burning, "[t]he First Amendment gen-
erally prevents government from proscribing speech or even expressive
conduct because of disapproval of the ideas expressed?' 68 Under the mili-
tary policy, the same conduct is permitted if it expresses heterosexuality
and proscribed if it expresses homosexuality. A heterosexual couple may
freely hold hands and kiss; if a lesbian couple engages in the same
conduct, they will be presumptively subject to discharge. A heterosexual
can proclaim his sexual orientation loudly, repeatedly, and wherever he
chooses; a gay or bisexual man proclaiming his sexual orientation is
subject to discharge. A heterosexual couple may engage in physical con-
tact for sexual pleasure; if a homosexual couple does the same, they are
punished. This selectivity further supports the application of strict First
Amendment scrutiny.
66 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1563 (4th ed. 1968).67 Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 197 (1986) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *215).
68R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992) (citations omitted).
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The First Amendment demands content neutrality to ensure that there
is "'equality of status in the field of ideas.' ' 69 This equality (or content-
neutrality) feature of the First Amendment is importantly related to the
underlying values of the First Amendment tradition (liberty and pluralism
discussed in Part I), for it prevents the political majority from achieving
a regulatory goal at the expense of the expressive interests of an unpopu-
lar or less powerful minority.70 The state therefore cannot selectively
discriminate against expressive conduct simply because of what it ex-
presses.
In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,7' for example, the Court
invalidated an ordinance prohibiting picketing because it exempted labor
picketing, thus violating the principle of neutral treatment of similarly
situated speakers. "Because picketing plainly involves expressive conduct
within the protections of the First Amendment, discriminations among
pickets must be tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest. 72
Had the ban applied neutrally to all picketing, it would have been upheld,
but the Court was unwilling to tolerate regimes "selectively suppressing
some points of view."73
In R.A. V., the Court applied the Mosley precept in a case of expressive
conduct ("fighting words") that is ordinarily beyond the First Amend-
ment's protection. 74 Nonetheless, the Court invalidated the St. Paul ordi-
nance penalizing cross-burning (and other expressions of hatred) because
the ordinance did not treat all symbolic "fighting words" equally, but
selectively prohibited those based on race, color, creed, religion, or gender.75
The equality value is directly implicated by the military's "don't ask,
don't tell" policy because it singles out same-sex conduct for treatment
different from different-sex conduct. Like the cross-burning ordinance in
R.A.V and the selective picketing prohibition in Mosley, the "don't ask,
don't tell" policy must therefore be subjected to stringent scrutiny.76
69 Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (quoting ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 27
(1948)).
70See Kenneth L. Karst, Equality as a Central Principle in the First Amendment, 43
U. CHI. L. REV. 20 (1975).
71408 U.S. 92 (1972). See also Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).72Mosley, 408 U.S. at 99 (citations omitted). The Court relied on both the First
Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause throughout the opinion. See id. at 94-95, 96,
100-01.
731d. at 97.
74 The Court accepted the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpretation of the St. Paul
ordinance as regulating only "fighting words," which are not protected under the Court's
First Amendment precedents. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542 (citing Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942)).
75 1d. at 2543-45. See generally David Cole, Neutral Standards and Racist Speech, 2
RECONSTRUCTION 65 (1992).
76For similar reasons, state employment discrimination against lesbian and gay
employees simply because of their sexual expression is presumptively at war with First
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III. The Military Exclusion Policy and Sodomy Prohibition Fail Strict
Scrutiny
To establish that strict scrutiny applies does not necessarily end the
constitutional inquiry. If the military's rationales are compelling, and if
the means it has chosen are narrowly tailored to further those ends, the
policy may withstand strict scrutiny.77 The government has typically ad-
vanced three "compelling" interests in defense of its policy.
A. Evidence of Unlawful Conduct
The government has in the past successfully evaded First Amendment
review altogether by casting its regulatory concern with expressions of
homosexuality as evidentiary in nature. As noted above, the government
consistently defeated First Amendment challenges to the old military
policy by arguing that it was not punishing a servicemember for saying,
"I am gay," but was simply using those words as evidence of the fact of
homosexual identity.78 Under the new regulation, it now admits that it is
not concerned with homosexual identity, but it will presumably now argue
that its concern is with homosexual conduct.
This argument falls for several reasons. First, the military's own
definition of the "conduct" with which it is concerned makes its argument
circular. The "conduct" encompassed by the military policy includes pure
speech, such as declarations of homosexuality. More importantly, its
definition of conduct selectively includes conduct (such as hand-holding,
kissing, and marriage) that expresses homosexuality, while excluding the
exact same conduct if it expresses heterosexuality. Thus, the military
cannot say it uses expressions of homosexuality only as evidence of
Amendment values. Courts have frequently struck down such discrimination as violative
of the First Amendment. National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (10th
Cir. 1984); Jantz v. Muci, 759 F. Supp. 1543 (D. Kan. 1991); Acanfora v. Board of Educ.,
491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir. 1974); cf. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (relying
on due process to protect federal employee dismissed because of a "homosexual" overture
made off the job); but see Singer v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247 (9th
Cir. 1976) (upholding dismissal of gay man who "flaunted" his "lifestyle"), vacated, 429
U.S. 1034 (1977).
The military's prohibition of sodomy is not so vulnerable on its face because the
prohibition applies to both heterosexual and homosexual conduct. But the equality value
underlying the requirement of content neutrality is nonetheless implicated. Sodomy laws
do not treat all sexual conduct equally, for they permit heterosexual vaginal intercourse
while prohibiting sodomy. Thus, they selectively single out some sexual conduct for
prohibition, just as the ordinance in R.A.V singled out some symbolic fighting words.
77E.g., Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (upholding
content-based regulation of corporate campaign speech after concluding that regulation
was narrowly tailored to the compelling interest of avoiding the distorting effects that
corporate wealth might have on public debate concerning political campaigns).
78 See cases cited supra note 11.
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homosexual conduct, because the conduct it prohibits is itself largely
limited to expressions of homosexuality.
Second, the expression is punished whether or not any other homo-
sexual conduct is ever demonstrated. If a servicemember so much as
admits (or demonstrates by hand-holding or the like) that she is lesbian,
she will be discharged unless she can rebut a presumption that she has
the desire or propensity to engage in homosexual acts. By adopting this
presumption, the policy punishes mere expression without more. Indeed,
the military policy treats a statement of homosexual identity more harshly
than speech advocating illegal activity, which may be punished only where
it is both intended and likely to produce imminent violence.79
Third, the government's presumption regarding homosexual expres-
sion is decidedly non-neutral. If homosexual statements and same-sex
kissing do have some correlation with conduct violating sodomy prohibi-
tions, the same is true of heterosexual statements and different-sex kiss-
ing, given empirical studies consistently showing that a large majority of
heterosexuals have engaged in oral sex and a significant minority have
engaged in anal sex.80 Both oral and anal sex violate the military's sodomy
prohibition, as well as that of most state sodomy laws.
B. The Unit Cohesion Rationale
During the 1993 congressional hearings on the gay/lesbian exclusion,
the military's main line of defense was that the presence of openly gay
and lesbian soldiers would undermine cohesion, discipline, and morale.8'
Colonel William Henderson laid out the government's case during House
hearings in 1993.82 He posited that the cohesion of the unit is the "central
factor" in the success of a military unit, citing the Shils and Janowitz
study of the Wehrmacht and the Stouffer study of the U.S. Army during
World War IH.83 He then argued that unit cohesion is impossible without
79Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam); see National Gay Task
Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270, 1274 (10th Cir. 1984) (invalidating regulation of
all homosexual advocacy short of public acts of criminal homosexual sodomy), aff'd nien.
by an equally divided Court, 470 U.S. 903 (1985); Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C.
Cir. 1969).
8 0 See ALFRED C. KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HUMAN MALE 393 (1948)
(59% of American males had engaged in oral sex, and 37% had engaged in some
homosexual experience during the 1940s); MORTON HUNT, SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE
1970s 199, 204 (1974) (90% of married couples under age 25 engaged in oral sex; nearly
25% of married couples under age 35 had engaged in anal-genital sex); PHILIP BLUMSTEIN
& PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES: MONEY, ,VORK, SEX 236 (1983) (over 70% of
heterosexual couples in the early 1980s had engaged in oral-genital sex).
81 See May 1993 House Hearings, supra note 65; July 1993 House Hearings, supra
note 12; July 1993 Senate Hearings, supra note 62.
82See May 1993 House Hearings, supra note 65, at 265-70 (testimony of Col. William
Darryl Henderson).
83 1d. at 265, referring to SAMUEL A. STOUFFER ET AL., THE AMERICAN SOLDIER:
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basic agreement among unit members about cultural values, an agreement
that is shattered if one of the unit members reveals himself or herself to
be gay or lesbian.
84
The "discipline, good order, and morale" argument may not even
satisfy rational basis review, much less strict scrutiny. Several lower courts
have rejected this justification under rational basis scrutiny because it has
no factual basis and is, at best, predicated on the prejudices of other
servicemembers s5 The government's own studies provide no evidence that
openly gay service personnel actually disrupt unit cohesion,8 6 and consid-
erable anecdotal evidence demonstrates that thousands of servicemembers
have been known by their colleagues to be lesbian or gay, with no nega-
tive repercussions for morale and unit cohesion.87 Even the studies cited
by Colonel Henderson undermine rather than support his point.88 The
Stouffer study found that shared religious belief was the main inspiring
(and cohering) force for our soldiers during World War II, but surely the
armed forces would not seriously defend barring atheists based upon this
study. The Shils and Janowitz study found that "primary group solidarity
in the Wehrmacht was based in part on latent homosexual tendencies"
among the soldiers.89 This sort of evidence is a frivolous basis for exclud-
ing lesbians and gay men from the military.
If open acknowledgement that some soldiers are gay or lesbian would
undermine unit cohesion, it can only do so by virtue of the prejudices of
other soldiers, a patently insufficient rationale even under minimal ra-
tional basis review.90 For the same reason that the armed forces cannot
COMBAT AND ITS AFTERMATH (1949); Edward A. Shils & Morris Janowitz, Cohesion and
Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War 11, 12 PUB. Op. Q. 280, 315 (1948).84May 1993 House Hearings, supra note 65, at 268.
85See Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57, 67-69 (D.C. Cir. 1993), rehearing en banc granted;
Selland v. Aspin, Civ. No. 93-1924-LFO (D.D.C. Sept. 28, 1993) (preliminary injunction);
Meinhold v. United States Dept. of Defense, 808 F. Supp. 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1993), appeal
pending.
86See GAYS IN UNIFORM: THE PENTAGON'S SECRET REPORTS xv (Kate Dyer ed., 1990)
(describing reports).
87 See RANDY SHILTS, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: LESBIANS AND GAYS IN THE U.S.
MILITARY, VIETNAM TO THE PERSIAN GULF (1993); MARY ANN HUMPHREY, MY COUNTRY,
MY RIGHT TO SERVE: EXPERIENCES OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN IN THE MILITARY, WORLD
WAR I TO THE PRESENT (1990); ALLAN BERUBI, COMING OUT UNDER FIRE: THE
HISTORY OF GAY MEN AND WOMEN IN WORLD WAR 11 (1990).88 See May 1993 House Hearings, supra note 65 at 270-78 (testimony of David R.
Segal, Professor of Sociology, Univ. of Maryland).
89 1n a perverse way, this may support the military exclusion: the homosocial armed
forces do indeed rely on "latent" homosexual feelings among servicemen but feel the need
to suppress this bonding feature in a country where many citizens are anti-homosexual. In
this way, "don't ask, don't tell" works as a way to maintain the public appearance of the
army as a heterosexual institution, while allowing a liberal amount of homosexual bonding
to go on beneath the surface. We note that the military does not rely on this perverse logic,
and we insist that such a defense of the exclusion amounts to a hypocrisy that should not
satisfy even the rational basis standard.
90City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (city cannot
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use the anti-Semitism of some soldiers to exclude Jews, the racism of
some soldiers to exclude Japanese Americans, or the religious bigotry of
some soldiers to exclude Southern Baptists, so the armed forces cannot
use the homophobia of some its members to exclude lesbians, gay men,
or bisexuals.
Morale and unit cohesion arguments were precisely the arguments
made by the military to continue its policy of racial segregation in the
1940s, 91 and are no more legitimate today than they were then.92 The
military's experience with desegregation also provides another ground for
suspecting the military's rationale regarding unit cohesion. Although most
white soldiers did not want to serve with black soldiers when President
Truman ordered desegregation in 1948, actual integration was unproblem-
atic, at least in part because integration led white soldiers to rid them-
selves of their earlier prejudices. 93 Precisely the same phenomenon has
been observed in Western countries that now allow openly lesbian and
gay personnel to serve.
94
As Judge Mikva observed in Steffan, the principle that the law should
not cater to prejudice has a particularly fitting parallel in First Amendment
law: the "heckler's veto."95 The First Amendment makes it impermissible
to silence speech because of the reaction of a hostile audience. 96 Yet the
notion that the "good order" 'of the military requires suppression of ex-
pression of homosexuality is nothing more than a decision to value the
hostile reactions of homophobic soldiers over the expressive freedom of
their gay and lesbian compatriots. Where First Amendment scrutiny is ap-
plied, such a rationale cannot justify the government's policy.
C. The Privacy Argument
A final argument sometimes made by defenders of the gay/lesbian
exclusion (but not by the top brass) is that it would invade the privacy of
heterosexual soldiers. This is the so-called "shower room argument":
straight servicemembers are said to be nervous about being seen naked in
deny zoning permit for home for the mentally disabled on ground that biased neighbors
will threaten safety of the mentally disabled residents).
91 See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Race and Sexual Orientation in the Military: Ending
the Apartheid of the Closet, 2 RECONSTRUCTION 52 (1993).
92 See Steffan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57 (D.C. Cir. 1993), reh'g en banc granted.
93See MORRIS J. MACGREGOR, JR., INTEGRATION OF THE ARMED FORCES, 1940-1965
at 54, 405, 408, 442 (1981); BERNARD C. NALTY, STRENGTH FOR THE FIGHT: A HISTORY
OF BLACK AMERICANS IN THE MILITARY 100 (1986).94 See May 1993 House Hearings, supra note 65 (testimony of Gregory M. Herek, on
behalf of the American Psychological Association); GAYS IN UNIFORM: THE PENTAGON'S
SECRET REPORTS, supra note 86, at 40-41, 54.
95 Steffan, 8 F.3d at 68.
96 Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
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the shower room by someone who might find them sexually attractive.
97
It is hard to credit this sort of anxiety as a compelling state interest, unless
it were accompanied by evidence of more tangible secondary effects, such
as a greater risk of sexual assault. But as yet there is no empirical
evidence, or even any anecdotal examples, that shower-room observations
have actually led to sexual assaults. The argument amounts to a raw
appeal to prejudice, which is an unacceptable (and certainly not a com-
pelling) policy for the state to embrace.
Moreover, even accepting arguendo that the military's goal is legiti-
mate, its policy is not narrowly tailored because it is underinclusive.98 It
does not bar closeted gay and lesbian soldiers. If anything, such closeted
soldiers would pose a greater threat to heterosexual soldiers' privacy than
those who have disclosed their sexual orientation, precisely because the
heterosexual soldier, fearful of his privacy, will have no way of identify-
ing who might pose this "threat" The fact that the policy singles out only
those gay and lesbian soldiers who acknowledge their sexual orientation
suggests that the military's interest is not in protecting privacy, but in
suppressing the expression of homosexual identity.
IV. Deference to the Military Should Not Save the Unconstitutional
Exclusionary Policies
In defending the gay/lesbian exclusion in court, the government's
initial argument tends to be that courts should defer to military judgment.
The purpose of this argument is either to lower the level of judicial
scrutiny back to rational basis, or to bootstrap a weak set of state interests
into a compelling interest.99 We have inverted the order of presentation
(looking at the state interests first, then turning to the general deference
point) to emphasize the irrationality of the government's substantive po-
sition. Even a deferential standard of review would be hard for the gov-
ernment to meet. We now emphasize that the deference argument is itself
97 Marine Corps Commandant Carl E. Mundy put the argument this way: "How would
you (or most American families) react if your son called and informed you that his
roommates for the next few years were two homosexuals? Would you be at all concerned?"
Quoted in John Lancaster, Why the Military Supports the Ban on Gays, WASH. POST, Jan.
28, 1993, at A8.
98 It is by no means clear that this is a legitimate rationale. Every time we use a locker
room, we risk the "invasion of privacy" that the military seeks to protect, whether we are
gay, bisexual, or heterosexual. Yet nowhere do we have separate gay and heterosexual
locker rooms, nor do we have separate gay and heterosexual sports teams. Thus, we have
all assumed the risk that when we use a locker room we expose our bodies to public view
by others of the same sex, and there may be no reasonable expectation of privacy to
protect.
99 See, e.g., Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503 (1986).
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rather complicated, and that the precedents do not clearly support defer-
ence on these issues.
It is true that the Court has frequently shown great deference to
military judgments about the need for "discipline" and "good order,"
upholding rules that would likely be unconstitutional in the civilian set-
ting. 00 This deference cannot be limitless, however. Surely, for example,
the military could not punish a soldier for criticizing President Clinton's
health plan or his foreign policy regarding Bosnia, even though it can
discipline an officer for urging enlisted men to disobey orders in war-
time. 10 1 Indeed, in Greer v. Spock,10 2 the Court suggested that the First
Amendment would be violated if a military commander selectively sought
to bar political candidates of one party from speaking on base. In Greer,
the Court upheld a policy excluding all political candidates, noting that
the military base's purpose was to train soldiers, not to serve as a public
forum, and that the military had a strong interest in avoiding partisan
politics. 03
Similarly, the Court in Goldman v. Weinberger'04 invoked deference
to military judgements when it upheld application of an Air Force regu-
lation that barred the wearing of headgear indoors to prohibit an orthodox
Jewish soldier from wearing a yarmulke. But again the Court emphasized
the narrowness of its deference and the generality of the regulation it was
1'0 See, e.g., Goldman, 475 U.S. 503 (upholding against a free exercise challenge an
Air Force regulation barring wearing of headgear indoors as applied to Jewish officer
wearing a yarmulke, and emphasizing deference due to military judgments regarding the
need to "foster instinctive obedience, unity, commitment, and esprit de corps"); Brown v.
Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (upholding Air Force regulation prohibiting distribution of
literature without permission of Commander, on ground that "since a commander is
charged with maintaining morale, discipline, and readiness, he must have authority over
the distribution of materials that could affect adversely these essential attributes of an
effective military force"); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (upholding content-based
exclusion from military base of political candidates, on ground that military base is not a
public forum); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974) (upholding court-martial of captain
for publicly urging enlisted personnel to refuse to obey orders to go to Vietnam, holding
that such speech is not protected by the First Amendment).
101 In Parker, the Court stated that "the members of the military are not excluded from
the protection granted by the First Amendment," even though the special character of the
military community "may render permissible within the military that which would be
constitutionally impermissible outside it" 417 U.S. at 758. See also Banks v. Garrett, 901
F.2d 1084, 1088 (Fed. Cir. 1990) ("military transfers that violate the First Amendment are
reviewable by this court"); United States v. Wilson, 33 M.J. 797, 799 (ACMR 1991)
("members of the armed forces enjoy the First Amendment's protections of freedom of
speech"); Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 1984) (same).
Several courts have drawn distinctions between military regulations that govern official
conduct and private conduct of a member of the military. E.g., Banks, 901 F.2d at 1088-89
(upholding regulation prohibiting reservist from writing unauthorized letter to Congress in
official capacity, but noting that he is free to do so in his private capacity).
102424 U.S. 828 (1976).
103 Id. at 828.
104475 U.S. 503 (1986).
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upholding. The regulation did not target religious minorities (though it
was insensitive to their concerns), and it is unlikely that the Court would
have upheld the ban if it selectively barred the wearing of yarmulkes.
105
Can there be doubt that if the military argued that it needs to segregate
black and white soldiers in order to preserve "morale" and "unit cohe-
sion" (and these were in fact the arguments deployed by the military in
the 1940s), courts would not defer?
The danger posed by the deference argument is vividly demonstrated
by the Supreme Court's decision in Korematsu v. United States,10 6 uphold-
ing the internment of Japanese American citizens in concentration camps
during World War II. That decision, justified by deference to the military's
race-based judgment about the threat posed by Japanese Americans, is one
of the Court's most embarrassing moments, and has been thoroughly
repudiated by history.107 The best that can be said for the Court's decision
is that it was reviewing military action during wartime. Where, as here,
a policy is judged in peacetime, similar justifications for deference do not
exist.
Thus, while traditional deference to the military makes any challenge
to military policy difficult, it is not an insurmountable barrier. Even where
government has "plenary power" that power must be exercised in accord-
ance with constitutional limits. 10 8 In United States v. Robel,10 9 for example,
105 Indeed, several years later, in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990),
the Supreme Court held that the Free Exercise Clause is not implicated by prohibitions
generally applicable to all, even where they disproportionately burden particular religious
groups. Under this reasoning, the regulation in Goldman would be upheld even if it were
not in a military setting.
In Anderson v. Laird, 466 F.2d 283, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076
(1972), the D.C. Circuit invalidated a military regulation compelling chapel attendance at
military academies. It rejected the district court's deference to the military and stated:
This deference to military decision making has been justified by the military's
role, its mandate to prepare for the waging of war, and the necessity of this
mandate for our national security. However, deference has inherent limitations
which have also been fully recognized in judicial decision. Thus, although First
Amendment rights to free speech and expression may be "less" for a soldier than
a civilian, they are by no means lost to him.
Id. at 294-95.
106323 U.S. 214 (1944).
07 
See COMMISSION ON WARTIME RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS,
PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED (1982).
18 See, e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 712-13 (1893) (Congress's
plenary power over immigration must be exercised "consistent[ly] with.., the Constitu-
tion"); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 537 (1952) ("the power to expel aliens ... is,
of course, subject to judicial intervention under the paramount law of the Constitution");
Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 96 (1961) ("congres-
sional power in this sphere [protection from foreign invasion], as in all spheres, is limited
by the First Amendment").
109389 U.S. 258 (1967).
343
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the Court struck down a statutory ban on employing Communist Party
members at United States defense facilities. The Court acknowledged
Congress's plenary power over war and national defense, but held that
even the government's legitimate concerns about "the danger of sabotage
and espionage in national defense industries" did not justify overriding
First Amendment rights:
the phrase "war power" cannot be invoked as a talismanic
incantation to support any exercise of congressional power which
can be brought within its ambit. "[E]ven the war power does not
remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liber-
ties" ..... [The] concept of 'national defense' cannot be deemed
an end in itself, justifying any exercise of legislative power
designed to promote such a goal .... It would indeed be ironic
if, in the name of national defense, we would sanction the
subversion of one of those liberties-the freedom of associa-
tion-which makes the defense of the Nation worthwhile." 0
Finally, any argument that the courts should defer to the govern-
ment's "expert" judgment in matters of military discipline must address
the fact the government's "experts" themselves have often been skeptical
of the exclusion of gays and lesbians. The Crittenden Report written for
the Department of Defense in 1957 was critical of the military's justifica-
tion for excluding gays and lesbians in the 1950s. The report rejected as
baseless the argument that such soldiers would be subject to blackmail.,
The Department suppressed that report. The next examinations of the
issue by experts for the Department were the now-famous PERSEREC 112
reports written in 1988 and 1989.113 These reports concluded that lesbians,
bisexuals, and gay men are just as capable of serving in the armed forces
as straight persons and suggested that their continued exclusion rests upon
nothing more than prejudice and a desire to suppress homosexuality. The
Government Accounting Office has written a report that also undermines
the logic of the current exclusion by demonstrating that gays and lesbians
have served without incident in the military ranks in other countries, and
HOld. at 263-64.
l11See GAYS IN UNIFORM, supra note 86, at xv.112 PESEREC stands for the Defense Personnel Security Research and Education
Center.
113Theodore R. Sarbin & Kenneth E. Karols, Nonconforming Sexual Orientations and
Military Suitability (Dec. 1988), reprinted in GAYs IN UNIFORM, supra note 86, at 3-97;
Michael A. McDaniel, Preservice Adjustment of Homosexual and Heterosexual Military
Accessions: Implications for Security Clearance Suitability (Jan. 1989), reprinted in GAYS
IN UNIFORM, supra note 86, at 111-35 (gay and lesbian personnel adjust at least as well
as straight personnel).
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in police and fire departments in the United States. 114 If the most neutral
and least politicized "experts" within our government are skeptical of the
need for exclusion, one should hesitate before "deferring" to the "exper-
tise" of other government officials inspired more by politics than by the
nation's defense needs.
V. Implications of the Sex-as-Expressive-Conduct Thesis
Even if we have thus far established a prima facie doctrinal case
for invalidating both sodomy laws and the military exclusion under the
authority of the First Amendment, our argument-especially our view that
sodomy regulations themselves trigger strict First Amendment review-
raises a host of broader questions. While different critics might emphasize
different questions, we have identified three key issues for discussion:
Does our extension of First Amendment protection to private sodomy also
reach public sex, and if not, haven't we inverted the First Amendment's
concern for public dialogue? If obscenity can be regulated to further
social interests in good order and morality, why can't sodomy be regu-
lated on similar grounds? And more broadly, does this argument invalidate
all regulation of morality?
A. The First Amendment and Regulation of Private Sexuality
At least superficially, our analysis creates an anomaly in First Amend-
ment jurisprudence. Normally, First Amendment concerns are greater
when a person engages in expressive activity in public. Certain First
Amendment images capture this paradigm: the soapbox speaker, the dis-
sident burning a flag on the steps of the Capitol, and even the nude dancer
in a bar. The same images in a private setting-standing in one's living
room making a speech, burning a flag in one's basement, or dancing nude
in one's bedroom-would appear to raise less central First Amendment
issues. This is in part because of the First Amendment's primary concern
with protecting public debate and dialogue, although it may also be at-
tributable to the lack of prosecution of such conduct. Both practical
difficulties of detection and other constitutional protections, such as the
Fourth Amendment and the due process right to privacy, limit the state's
ability to intrude upon these private realms independently of the First
Amendment.
Yet while we maintain that regulation of private sodomy violates the
First Amendment, we do not maintain that public sexual intercourse is
similarly protected. Although public intercourse may be as expressive as
114 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEFENSE FORCE MANAGEMENT: DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE'S POLICY ON HOMOSEXUALITY 4-6 (1992).
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private intercourse, and therefore would be entitled to stringent scrutiny,
the state has a stronger interest in regulating public sex. Such an interest
arises from the extremely high value our society places on maintaining
the private character of sexual conduct, and from the related interest in
not subjecting unconsenting adults and children to explicit sexual conduct.
It is difficult to articulate precisely why public sex disturbs most of us so
much more profoundly than other forms of offensive expression, but there
is little doubt that it does. We believe that the answer lies in the pub-
lic/private line itself, which is seen as central to maintaining the mystery,
sanctity, and (indeed) sexiness of sex. I" 5
Providing greater First Amendment protection for private rather than
public expressive conduct may seem unusual, but in fact such protection
accords with First Amendment jurisprudence regarding sexual speech. On
matters of sex, First Amendment doctrine already provides greater protec-
tion to private than to public conduct. While the Court has frequently
upheld state regulation of the public sale or display of pornography,"t6 the
Court in Stanley v. Georgia struck down a law regulating the private
possession of obscenity. Stanley's reasoning, predicated on an amalgam
of First Amendment and privacy concerns, is fully applicable to sodomy
laws: "[The makers of our Constitution] 'sought to protect Americans in
their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They
conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone-the most
comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized man."'
117
This reveals a paradox in the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence:
the First Amendment is most vigilant in protecting political expression in
a public setting, and sexual expression in a private setting. Culture more
than logic probably inspires this paradox: politics is considered intrinsi-
cally public, and sex intrinsically private. Indeed, sex in America has
traditionally been a matter for secrecy and taboo.
While we do not seek to challenge the regulation of public sexual
intercourse, we do challenge the military's regulation of other public
displays of sexual intimacy, such as hand-holding, kissing and the like.
But our attack is not predicated on an absolute right to engage in such
conduct in public; in other cultures and other eras, many of these displays
were (and are) generally forbidden. Rather, we challenge the content-dis-
criminatory nature of the military's regulation: when hand-holding ex-
1l5 This point is developed in detail by David Cole, Playing By Pornography's Rules:
The Regulation of Sexual Expression (1994) (unpublished manuscript on file with authors).
"
6 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49 (1973).
"17 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. at 564 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
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presses heterosexuality, it is permitted, but when it expresses homosexu-
ality, it is condemned. Such a departure from content neutrality cannot be
justified by recourse to the public/private line, because it draws the line
differently depending on the content of the expression. Thus, if society
tolerated public heterosexual sexual intercourse, but barred public homo-
sexual sodomy, First Amendment concerns would be raised.
Finally, in accepting the public/private line for purposes of regulation
of public sexual conduct, we do not mean to endorse it. Maintenance of
this distinction has played an integral role in the suppression of gays,
lesbians, and bisexuals. Before the Stonewall riots of June 1969, social
mores and regulations were designed to keep people with so-called "de-
viant" sexual orientations in the closet. When the drag queens, gays, and
lesbians fought back against a routine raid of the Stonewall Inn, they
triggered a chain reaction of "coming out" by closeted baby boomers and
others. What had been private, and deeply secret, became public, and
deeply political. For those who came out, the experience was strongly
emotional, usually liberating and often traumatic, because people were
politicizing an element of their identity they had been taught to keep
hidden. Once one was "out," there was no turning back. The private
became the public.
That was the experience of the baby boomers, and their mass coming
out has in turn affected the next generation. The post-Kennedy assassina-
tion generation has grown up not only knowing openly lesbian and gay
people (the boomers had this advantage), but also being exposed to a
culture whose creation is specifically that of known lesbian, gay, and
bisexual scholars, entertainers, filmmakers and playwrights, artists, ath-
letes, writers, and even political leaders. This new generation takes for
granted that homosexual and bisexual expression is part of public culture.
To the extent this view prevails, it may indeed strengthen our argument
that sexual expression is entitled to strong First Amendment protection,
by undermining the public/private distinction so critical to the suppression
of much sexual expression.
B. Obscenity Regulation and Morality
Implicit in our analysis of the military exclusion policy is the notion
that it is impermissible to regulate sexual conduct simply because it
offends other people's moral values. Yet, when it comes to obscenity, the
Supreme Court allows the state to do precisely that. The rationale for
prohibiting obscenity is to protect "the social interest in order and moral-
ity.' 118 If speech can be regulated in that interest, doesn't it follow that
118 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957), quoted with approval in Paris
Adult Theatre 1, 413 U.S. at 61.
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sexual conduct may be similarly regulated? We believe it does not, for
three reasons. 119
First, the obscenity doctrine is a very narrow exception to the First
Amendment's general rule, which is precisely the opposite: namely, that
society may not regulate expression in order to uphold morality. In Cohen
v. California,'20 Justice Harlan flatly repudiated the state's argument that
a law barring offensive conduct was justified to uphold public morality.
He reasoned that the principle advanced by the state had no stopping
point, and would justify any regulation of expression:
the principle contended for by the State seems inherently bound-
less. How is one to distinguish this ["Fuck"] from any other
offensive word? Surely the State has no right to cleanse public
debate to the point where it is grammatically palatable to the
most squeamish among us. Yet no readily ascertainable general
principle exists for stopping short of that result were we to affirm
the judgment below.121
For this reason, a majority of the Court has not permitted the state
to penalize speech for its offensive moral content beyond the narrow
category of obscenity per se. Where New York attempted to prohibit a
non-obscene film, Lady Chatterley's Lover, because it undermined moral-
ity by presenting adultery in a positive light, the Court invalidated its
effort. 122 When Jacksonville, Florida prohibited the display of nudity at
drive-in movie theaters, the Court again struck down the ordinance. 123 And
when Indiana sought to require otherwise nude dancers to wear pasties
and G-strings to uphold public morality, only four Justices upholding the
statute felt that the morality justification was permissible.
24
g19For a general critique of obscenity doctrine, see Cole, Sex and Civilization, supra
note 115. For purposes of this Article, however, we do not attack obscenity doctrine itself
but maintain that even accepting obscenity doctrine, the regulation of private sodomy
cannot be constitutionally justified.
120403 U.S. 15 (1971).
121 d. at 25.
122Kingsley Intl. Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of New York, 360 U.S. 684
(1959).
123Erznoznick v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
'4Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2456, 2461 (1991). "[Tihe public indecency
statute furthers a substantial government interest in protecting order and morality." Id. at
2462 (Rehnquist, J., writing for the plurality joined by O'Connor and Kennedy, JJ.). Only
one Justice found nude dancing to fall outside the purview of First Amendment protection,
Id. at 2463 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). The fifth vote disclaimed reliance on
morality, and instead relied on the secondary effects specifically associated with nude
dancing bars. Id. at 2468-71 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment). Four Justices would
have struck down the rule as violative of the First Amendment. Id. at 2471 (White, J.,
dissenting, joined by Marshall, Blackman, and Stevens, JJ.).
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Second, sodomy may be many things, but it is not obscene. Obscenity
is limited to sexually explicit depictions of sexual conduct that are pat-
ently offensive and lack any social value. 125 Since sodomy is practiced by
a vast majority of the American public, it can hardly be characterized
as "patently offensive.' Moreover, much non-obscene pornography-gay,
lesbian, and heterosexual-contains depictions of sodomy. Finally, even
the obscene is protected in the privacy of the home. Thus, if regulation
of sodomy could be analogized to regulation of obscenity, the precedents
permitting regulation of the latter would not justify criminalization of
private acts of consensual sodomy.
C. Justice Scalia's Slippery Slope?
Justice Scalia has already registered his objection to the consequences
of the argument advanced here. In Barnes, he warned that the Court's
willingness to treat nude dancing as expressive conduct was an invitation
to subject "sadomasochism, cockfighting, bestiality, suicide, drug use, pros-
titution, and sodomy" to First Amendment scrutiny.126 If the Court were
to apply its expressive conduct doctrine to nude dancing, he suggested, the
First Amendment might well incorporate the "Thoreauvian 'you-may-do-
what-you-like-so-long-as-it-does-not-injure-someone-else' beau ideal"'lz7 In
one sense Scalia was correct; the argument advanced here, like the argu-
ment advanced by the dissenters in Barnes, has broad implications for
so-called morals regulation. However, we view that as a positive, not a
negative feature. And we think Justice Scalia greatly overstated the con-
sequences, because much of the conduct he believes should continue to
be regulated would clearly satisfy the First Amendment test we have
proposed here.
As Justice Harlan pointed out in Cohen, the slippery slope argument
can be made just as strongly in the opposite direction:1 2 if we are willing
to permit the state to regulate expressive conduct solely because we object
to what it communicates, what is to stop the state from regulating all
expression on that basis? Once one recognizes that First Amendment
concerns are triggered by the regulation of expressive conduct, as virtu-
ally everyone (beyond Justice Black) does, the seemingly simple distinc-
tion between conduct and speech dissolves, and difficult lines must be
drawn. We insist on nothing more than what the Supreme Court estab-
l25Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
126 Barnes, 111 S. Ct. at 2465 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). Justice Scalia's
list largely replicates that compiled by Lord Patrick Devlin as part of his classic defense
of sodomy laws. See LORD PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965).
127 See David Cole, Sexual Conduct and the First Amendment, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 30,
1993, at 23.
128 See supra note 32 and note 115.
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lished in Texas v. Johnson: that rationales long rejected as a basis for
regulating "pure speech" cannot be accepted when the state is regulating
conduct because of what it communicates.
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Moreover, once one applies the principle Justice Scalia himself has
advocated for analyzing regulation of expressive conduct, it becomes
relatively easy to draw some of the lines Scalia suggested would dissolve.
Regulation of "cockfighting" and "bestiality," for example, are justified
by the interest in protecting animals from unnecessary harm and pain,
irrespective of what these practices express to the rest of society. Simi-
larly, drug use and prostitution are often accompanied by significant
secondary effects unrelated to the suppression of what those practices
express. Drug use, for example, undermines society's interest in health
and safety, and contributes directly to violent crime. Prostitution is a
practice almost invariably accompanied by violence against and exploita-
tion of women, and also poses significant health concerns. All of these
harms are independent of the "message" these practices send to the rest
of society.'30
Sadomasochism presents a more difficult case. The state has a legiti-
mate, non-expression-related interest in protecting against unconsented-to
bodily injury and other harms (such as heightened risks of the transmis-
sion of AIDS). On the other hand, where consenting adults engage in
sadomasochistic play that stops short of injury, 31 it would seem that the
state has no greater interest in barring such conduct than in prohibiting
sodomy. One point is clear: state regulation of sadomasochism would be
unconstitutional if premised only upon the unease or disgust that some
citizens harbor against sadomasochism, without more.
32
12 9 Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989).
130Most of the harms are also independent of the existing illegality of these activities.
Although we concede that many of the secondary effects of prostitution (especially some
of the dangers to women) are the result of its illegality, the ways in which prostitution
might exploit women for male profit might survive the illegality, as would most of the
public health concerns.
131 See Susan Etta Keller, Viewing and Doing: Complicating Pornography's Meaning,
81 GEO. L. J. 2195, 2217-22 (1993). See generally GEORGES BATAILLE, EROTISM (Mary
Dalwood trans., 1962); MARQUIS DE SADE, JUSTINE (Richard Seaver and Austryn Wain-
house trans., 1965); GILLES DELEUZE, MASOCHISM (Jean McNeil trans., 1971); RonERT J.
STOLLER, PERVERSION: THE EROTIC FORM OF HATRED (1975); LEATHERFOLK: RADICAL
SEX, PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND PRACTICE (Mark Thompson ed., 1991); PAT CALIFIA, MACHO
SLUTS (1988). For a fascinating life example, see JAMES MILLER, THE PASSION OF MICHEL
FOUCAULT (1993).
132 A similar analysis would govern regulation of incest. Regulation of incest is in
most instances justified by interests in preventing child abuse, nonconsensual sexual
encounters, and health problems (birth defects). The difficulty of discerning "true consent"
in family settings, and the disruptive effect of incest on family relationships may well
justify broad prohibitions of incest. But incest regulation should not be upheld if it is
solely based on society's moral disapproval, without the identification of non-expression
related justifications.
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Perhaps the most difficult issue presented by sadomasochism is the
legitimacy of parentalism: can the state regulate conduct that does physi-
cal harm to an individual, even if the individual has freely consented? The
same issue is presented by the regulation of suicide, and a wide range
of other personally harmful conduct. While this raises significant moral
and ethical questions, those questions are beyond the scope of the First
Amendment, and therefore of this Article. We note only that under the
approach we have proposed, the First Amendment itself does not forbid
the state from regulating such conduct. If the state is otherwise free to
enact laws to save individuals from self-imposed or consensual physical
harm, the First Amendment would not bar such laws, because the regula-
tion of conduct causing physical harm is distinct from what the conduct
communicates.
VI. Conclusion
The distinction between speech and conduct has long troubled First
Amendment scholars, while the legitimacy of morals legislation has long
been the focus of a different jurisprudential debate. In this Article, we
have sought to demonstrate that the two debates are linked, and that the
Court's current doctrinal approach to expressive conduct may offer a
fruitful avenue for evaluating the constitutionality of morals legislation.
It also suggests that what may underlie the morals legislation debate may
be very similar to what underlies debate about the limits of dissent: to
what extent can society suppress conduct or expression simply because it
finds what it communicates offensive, disgusting, or harmful?
The link we draw between morals legislation and regulation of ex-
pressive conduct is a particularly appropriate subject for this Symposium,
because if Stonewall stands for anything it stands for the refusal of gay
and lesbian people to allow their conduct to be regulated by other people's
morals. The resistance sparked by Stonewall took form in gay and lesbian
individuals' "coming out," identifying themselves, and insisting on the
right to be gay or lesbian in a predominantly heterosexual society. In other
words, the resistance consisted of an insistence on the right to dissent,
and the right to equal respect for dissent that is implicit in our First
Amendment tradition. Gays and lesbians, more than perhaps any other
group in society, have reason to understand the deep interconnection
between conduct, expression, identity, and the right to take part in the
public debate that constitutes us as a community.
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